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SEC STOCK-OPTION EXEMPTION UPHELD
Continental Oil Company v. Perlitz
176 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1959)
Plaintiff, a corporation, with its capital stock registered on the New
York Stock Exchange, brought an action against one of its officers and
directors, pursuant to Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
to recover the profits realized by the defendant as a result of the sale and
subsequent purchase of capital stock of the plaintiff. The defendant sold his
shares on May 16 and 17, 1957, and purchased shares on August 28, 1957,
in exercise of his rights under a restricted stock-option plan of the plaintiff.2
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission3 Rule X-
16B-3 4 was valid, and profits realized through the acquisition of stock
pursuant to a restricted stock-option plan were exempt from the liability
imposed by the Exchange Act.5
Prior to 1934, the majority of state courts had imposed no sanctions on
directors, officers and other insiders6 who traded in their own company
stock, buying and selling according to secret and advance information to
which they alone had access.7 Congressional committees disclosed "the
1 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (hereafter referred to as the Exchange Act). "For the
purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of
less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with
a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective
of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. . . . This subsection shall not be con-
strued to cover . . . any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and
regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."
(Emphasis supplied.)
2 The defendant purchased the stock on August 28, 1957, at a lower price than that
received for a corresponding number of shares in the May, 1957 sales.
3 Hereafter sometimes referred to as the S.E.C. or the Commission.
4 2 CCH Fed. Sec. Law Rep. Par. 25853. "Any acquisition of non-transferable
options or of shares of stock including stock acquired pursuant to such options by a
director or officer of the issuer of such stock shall be exempt from the operation of
Section 16(b) of the Act if the stock or option was acquired pursuant to a bonus,
profit-sharing, retirement, stock-option, thrift, savings or similar plan meeting all the
following conditions: .... ." The rule lists the strict limitations under which such plans
will meet the exemption-the particular plan in the instant case meets these conditions.
5 176 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
6 15 U.S.CA. § 78p(a). "Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an
exempted security). .. ."
7 Carpenter, Adm'r. v. Danforth, 52 Barbs (NY) 581 (1868); Board of Comm'rs
of Tippencanoe County v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 15 Am. Rep. 245 (1873); Deaderick v.
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flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties and speculation in pools trading
by directors, officers, and principal stockholders on the basis of information
not available to the general public and small stockholders." s Section 16(b)
of the Exchange Act was enacted by Congress in 19349 to protect these
"outside" interests from at least short-term speculation of this nature.
To soften the "hardship of an admitted crude rule of thumb,"'01 the
S.E.C. was authorized to except certain transactions from the application
of the Section." Rule X-16B-3 was first adopted on October 9, 1935. It
provided, at that time, for an exemption for certain transactions in connec-
tion with specific types of stock-option plans. 12 Because of the favorable
tax treatment afforded restricted stock-options by the Internal Revenue Act
of 1950,13 the rule was subsequently revised and amended, and on May 21,
1956, the S.E.C. issued a release which provided exemption for stock
acquired pursuant to non-transferable options.14
The legality of the delegation to the Commission to provide for any
exemptions at all was challenged in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.'5 The court
said, however:
Wilson, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.) 108 (1874). A relatively small body of courts recognized
the fiduciary relationship which directors and officers held and required a full disclosure
of all material facts affecting the value of the shares. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45
S.E. 232 (1903). See 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133 (1939) for a general discussion of the
common law cases.
8 Sen. Com. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. at 9 (1934); "Stock Exchange
Practices," Report of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Sen. Rep. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. at 55 (1934); For additional illustrations of insider trading abuses,
see Pecora, "Wall Street Under Oath" 268-69 (1939).
9 Supra note 1.
30 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 at 240 (1943).
31 Supra note 1; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78w(a). "The Commission and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall each have power to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the execution of the functions vested in them by
this chapter and may for such purpose classify issuers, securities, exchanges, and other
persons or matters within their respective jurisdictions. ... "
12 Exemption from Section 16(b) liability was provided if the stock-option met
the following conditions: (1) the purchase was pursuant to a non-transferable option
granted prior to June 6, 1934, in connection with an employment contract, (2) the
sale was made subsequent to October 9, 1935, (3) the plan was approved at a stock-
holders' meeting, and (4) the price of the stock under the option was at least as high
as the market price of the stock at the time the option was granted. On February 25,
1949, the Commission withdrew the old rule and substituted one which dealt with
bonus, profit-sharing or similar plans. 1952-56 CCH Fed. Sec. Law Rep. Par. 76388,
Exchange Act Release No. 5312. May 21, 1956.
13 26 U.S.C.A. § 130A; now § 421, I.RA. 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. § 421; 26 U.S.C.A.
§§ 401, 404.
14 Supra note 12. The rule was amended in 1952 to exempt purchases pursuant to
restricted stock option plans which met the same standards as had been provided in the
rule for bonus plans. The last amendment in 1956 added purchases of non-transferable
options and eliminated the provision requiring the security to be received from the
issuer for services.
15 136 F.2d 231, 148 A.L.R. 300, cert. denied 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
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Guiding the Commission in the exercise of an actually limited
authority is the quite adequate standard . . . that its regulations
be consistent with the expressed purpose of the statute16 .... The
delegation serves no other than the commendable function of reliev-
ing the statute from imposing undue hardship and of giving it
flexibility in administration.17
Serious doubts concerning the validity of the rule itself were created by the
decision in Greene v. Dietz.'8 Plaintiffs, stockholders in the corporation,
sued to recover profits realized by the defendants, directors and employees
of the corporation, as a result of sales of stock at higher prices than that
paid when the stock was purchased under a restricted stock-option plan of
the corporation. Although the majority opinion affirmed the decision for
the defendants because they had acted in reliance on the rule,19 the court
said,
Indeed, although not essential to our opinion, we express doubt as
to the power of the Commission to promulgate Rule X-16B-3 inas-
much as the Rule's broad language may permit acts by insiders
sought to be prevented by the Securities Exchange Act ... 20
Later cases2 ' arising under Section 16(b) and Rule X-16B-3 similarly
held for the directors or officers who had made profits acting in good faith
reliance on the rule,22 although the opinions reflected the concern over the
effect of the dictum in the Greene case.
The significance of the instant decision is two-fold. First, there is the
re-affirmation of the judicial confidence in the Commission's expertise on
these highly technical matters and its ability to formulate rules and regula-
tions within its delegated powers. Second, and most important, is the effect
that the decision will have in clearing the confusion that has reigned since
the Greene case. The court has recognized that the purpose behind the
statute was to prevent abuses of fiduciary relationships and not to impose
absolute liability on transactions which are open and above board. The
instant case reflects the argument of the Commission in its memorandum
filed in the Greene case: "It does not follow that because some stock-options
are pregnant with fraudulent possibilities that every type of option is
necessarily so. ''23 Gerald H. Swedlow
10 Supra notes 1 and 8.
17 Id. at 240.
18 247 F.2d 689 (1957).
19 15 U.S.CA. § 78w(a). "... No provision of this title imposing any liability
shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or
regulation of the Commission or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be amended
or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any
reason."
20 Id. at 692.
21 Gruber v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Perlman
v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. O'Neill,
168 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Mo. 1958).
22 Supra note 19.
23 CCH Fed. Sec. Law Service, Current, Par. 90,821 at 92577.
